I. Introduction
The increased importance of data in modern consumer finance and the resulting digitization of massive amounts of consumer information have caused a proliferation of data systems that store and transmit sensitive personal information. While the use of such consumer data enables financial institutions to deliver significant benefits to consumers, it also introduces new risks associated with securing the data.
In fact, stores of confidential consumer data have attracted the attention of cyber criminals who attack data storage systems for the purpose of gaining large-scale access to consumer financial information in order to commit fraud. 1 Since 2005, over 1,000 data breaches have been reported in the United States. Although it is popularly believed that most data breaches are the result of computer hacking, the logistical difficulties inherent in handling personal consumer information contained in data storage 1 Crimes that commonly incorporate stolen consumer information include payment fraud and identity theft. 3 See the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, -A Chronology of Data Breaches,‖ available at: www.privacyrights.org/ar/ChronDataBreaches.htm, providing a timeline of reported data breaches and a number of records containing personal consumer information that may have been exposed (accessed Sept. 4, 2008) . 4 In February, more than 4.2 million consumers' credit and debit card numbers and expiration dates were exposed as a result of a single data breach at Hannaford Bros. grocery chain. See Since1999, Congress and a number of state legislatures have enacted laws that address how consumers' personal information is stored, how it is maintained, the ways in which it must be safeguarded, and how it must be disposed of. This paper addresses several of these laws. However, the references to laws and legislative initiatives contained herein are not meant to be an exhaustive list of all federal or state regulations about private consumer information. Rather, this paper summarizes a sampling of related laws and initiatives. 27 In this context, personal information generally means an individual's name along with his or her Social Security number, account number (including direct deposit accounts, credit card numbers, and debit card numbers) together with passwords or access codes used with those accounts, and/or driver's license/state identification card number that also identifies that consumer. See also n. 41.
concludes with a summary of the regulatory environment, recent findings on the effectiveness of data breach notification laws in preventing subsequent fraud crimes, and thoughts on how consumers can be shielded from harm associated with data breaches and information security failures.
II. Consumer Data Provisions of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act
In 1999, Congress enacted the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act, also known simply as the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLB Act). The underlying intent of the GLB Act was to modernize and enhance competition in the financial services industry by repealing provisions of the -nonpublic personal information‖ is collected and disclosed about customers. Privacy notices must also detail how such information is used, how the financial institution protects or safeguards the information, and with whom the information might be shared. Additionally, privacy notices need to inform customers of their right, in many instances, to opt out of having their information shared with third parties and to opt out of having certain information (such as credit report or application information) shared with their financial institution's affiliates.
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The financial privacy rule essentially requires financial institutions to notify customers about the protection of their personal information. Noting that industry analysts have raised the concern that most notices merely satisfy the basic legal requirement to explain obligations and rights accurately, workshop participants observed that many notices seem to fall far short when it comes to providing explanations 32 15 U.S.C. § 6809(3)(A) defines -financial institution‖ as -any institution the business of which is engaging in financial activities as described in section 1843(k) of title 12‖ (12 U.S.C. 1843(k) (2007)). 33 The FTC defines pretexting as -the use of false pretenses, including fraudulent statements and impersonation, to obtain consumers' personal financial information, such as bank balances.‖ See the FTC's website: www.ftc.gov/privacy/privacyinitiatives/pretexting.html (accessed Aug. 19, 2008) . 34 Codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6801(a) et seq. 35 The right to opt out of information sharing between affiliates exists under the Fair Credit Reporting Act.
that are meaningful to the reader. This is a sentiment echoed by consumers, state attorneys general, and privacy advocates-all of whom have expressed their concern over the complexity of privacy notices and the ability of consumers to understand the terms they contain, 36 and some of whom have raised the issue of consumer desensitization to mailed notices and alerts. 37 Responding to these concerns, regulators have provided updated guidance on how institutions might structure simpler and more comprehensible notices.
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Under the safeguards rule, 39 financial institutions 40 must develop written security plans detailing how they will protect the confidentiality and integrity of personal consumer information. 41 Plans may be tailored to the organization's size and complexity, the activities the organization undertakes, and the type of information handled, but they must take into consideration all areas of an organization's operations, 36 See, for example, Joanna Glasner, 41 The terms -personal information‖ or -personally identifiable information,‖ as used by the FTC, -mean individually identifiable information from or about an individual consumer including, but not limited to: (a) a first and last name; (b) a home or other physical address, including street name and name of city or town; (c) an email address or other online contact information; (d) a telephone number; (e) a Social Security number; (f) credit or debit card information, including card number, expiration date, and security code; (g) a persistent identifier, such as a customer number held in a -cookie‖ or processor serial number, that is combined with other available data that identifies an individual consumer; and (h) information that is combined with any of (a) through (g) …‖ In including accounting for areas such as employee management and training, information systems management, and system failure planning.
Workshop participants explained that developing an appropriate written information security program to safeguard personal consumer information requires institutions to take a number of steps.
These steps include: (1) Last, provisions of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act seek to safeguard against pretexting by requiring financial institutions to protect consumers' information and by making it a crime for an individual to attempt to fraudulently access another's confidential information. As previously mentioned, 42 See pp. 12-14, noting that the FACT Act requires financial institutions covered under the GLB Act to incorporate rules about disposing of consumer data into written information security program practices required by the GLB Act. 43 the provision by a person of suspicious-looking documents or information, the receipt of a notice from a consumer credit reporting agency that an individual's file is frozen or that there is a discrepant address on 83 Codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(g). 84 Noting that fraudsters and identity thieves frequently look for consumer card information printed on sales receipts, and characterizing receipts with full credit or debit card numbers and expiration dates as a -golden ticket‖ for identity thieves, the FTC has issued guidance to businesses to help them understand the importance of printing receipts containing truncated information; file, or, the use of a newly applied for line of credit for expenditures commonly associated with fraud. 91 Under the address discrepancy portion of the regulations, financial institutions that receive notice from consumer reporting agencies that there is a difference between the address they have provided and the consumer's addresses on file with the agency must take steps to verify that the -consumer report relates to the consumer about whom [the information has been] requested.‖ 92 Such verification steps, which must establish a reasonable belief that the consumer is who he or she purports to be, include comparing the address with previously held information, obtaining corroborative information from third-party sources, and contacting the consumer to confirm.
Overall, the red flag and address discrepancy rules, which went into effect on November American and Canadian customers have noted that they will be forced either to differentiate between their customers, implementing some sort of earmarking system, or to simply -extend blanket coverage‖ as a result of U.S. regulation. 94 Moreover, and reflecting the challenges that many nonbanks covered under the act face, the National Automobile Dealers Association (NADA) has opposed the rules. The NADA has argued that many dealers will be unable to meet the onerous burden of detecting fraud and identity theft, and that recognizing activities that indicate fraud is simply beyond the many dealers' or dealerships' abilities. 95 And while some American banks have also expressed displeasure with the rules-for example, the Illinois Bankers Association called them -excessive and overly burdensome‖ 96 -most domestic financial institutions have simply communicated apprehension that compliance, training, and ongoing implementation will require a considerable expenditure of resources. 97 Indeed, a recent survey of 300 financial institutions found that almost half will -either barely meet or will miss the [November 1 red flag and address discrepancy rule] deadline.‖ 98 Nonetheless, and despite these concerns, many banks have praised regulators for taking into consideration that not all financial institutions are alike and for providing flexibility surrounding the creation of fraud detection programs under the rules. 99 In the end, many technology security experts view these rules as necessary in today's digital environment. Danny Shaw, a risk management expert with the technology auditing firm of Jefferson Wells, notes that financial institutions simply -need to look at this as part of their normal best practice.‖ 100 Moreover, Heather
Grover, a director of product management for Experian, believes -that many [financial institutions] will eventually come around when they see the benefits of protecting their customers, as well as a decrease in fraud losses.‖ 101
IV. State Laws About Social Security Numbers
When the federal government established a system of assigning Social Security numbers to Americans in 1936, its primary purpose was to create a system whereby workers' wages could be tracked and eligibility for retirement benefits could be determined. 102 At the time, the role that Social Security numbers would come to play for today's consumers and their eventual (and resulting) popularity among data thieves was unforeseeable. 103 Indeed, Social Security numbers have become a favorite target for cyber criminals, a -crown jewel‖ 104 of consumers' personal information, a -magic key‖ for identity thieves. 105 The Government Accountability Office has noted that Social Security numbers -are a key piece of information used to create false identities for financial misuse or assume another individual's identity,‖ and that -[m]ost often, identity thieves use Social Security numbers belonging to real people.‖ 106 Nonetheless, and despite widespread recognition that fraudsters often make use of others'
Social Security numbers, on the Internet the numbers are frequently available for purchase, 107 are posted inadvertently, 108 are available as a result of court proceedings, 109 or are readable on imaged documents made available by the government.
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Seeking to reduce the sale, availability of, and the resulting fraudulent use of Social Security numbers, 111 more than 42 states have, since 2005, 112 enacted some form of law that regulates the use of, or mandates a particular method for protecting, Social Security numbers. 113 However, the range of these laws is broad. Similar to the safeguards rule of the GLB Act, a number of state laws require written confidentiality policies designed to protect Social Security numbers; other state laws require that interorganizational access to Social Security numbers be limited to authorized personnel only; and still other state laws create requirements for disposing of documents containing Social Security numbers similar to the FACT Act's requirements for disposing of personal consumer information. Despite this range, the most common types of state legislation concerning Social Security numbers come in the form of laws that: (1) prohibit companies from printing the numbers on identification cards or other materials;
(2) restrict the intentional communication of Social Security numbers, whether by mail or public posting;
or (3) require that Social Security numbers be truncated, erased, or otherwise modified. 114 Arizona law, for example, prohibits the printing of Social Security numbers on identification cards and the intentional disclosure of the numbers to the general public and sets standards for the transmission of Social Security numbers over the Internet. 115 Meanwhile, Colorado and Georgia laws set special disposal requirements for Social Security numbers. 116 Georgia law requires Social Security numbers contained on paper records to be shredded and that they be completely erased when contained on electronic records, or to otherwise be 123 Second, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) has noted that although state laws about Social Security numbers provide -some consistency‖ in their protection of consumers' information, these laws vary widely. The GAO also found that inconsistency among the intentions of legislatures-particularly between intending to prevent identity theft and intending to increase privacy protections-remains a significant concern that must be addressed. 124 Echoing this notion-that policymakers' understanding of the relationship between failures in information security and fraud is varied-payments industry feedback provided during past conferences sponsored by the Payment Cards Center indicates that confusion abounds in the payments industry concerning the links that connect data breaches, identity theft, and fraud. 125 Indeed, the importance of establishing a common understanding of the differences between failures of privacy protections and fraud is made more prominent by recent research on data breaches and related financial crimes that indicates there is, perhaps, less of a link between data breaches and crimes related to personal consumer information than previously believed. Although the number of data breaches is increasing dramatically, 126 some observers report that the incidence of identity theft is decreasing. One 
V. State Laws About Data Security Breach Notification
The The final issues addressed during the workshop surrounded the impact that state data breach notification laws have on consumers, including how consumers respond in the wake of a data breach or suspected breach. Workshop participants noted that while many notices satisfy the basic legal requirements to explain obligations and rights accurately, notices, at times, may appear to fall short when providing explanations that are meaningful to their readers. To help resolve this problem and deal with difficult issues surrounding data breach notices, government agencies, consumer advocacy groups, and state regulators all make resources available to businesses to help craft clearer notices-notices that are capable of providing consumers with useful information in language that consumers are likely to understand. 141 Looking beyond whether consumers understand the data breach notices they receive, one workshop attendee noted that consumers often behave in ways that are difficult to predict. This phenomenon was recently addressed during a 2008 Payment Cards Center conference on fraud, when payments industry experts noted that there appears to be a significant disparity between what consumers say they will do after receiving a data breach notification and what they actually do. 142 Although consumers frequently report that they will stop shopping at a merchant deemed responsible for a data breach leading to the compromise of their personal information, conference participants noted that in many cases these same merchants report increased sales levels after a publicized breach. Additional awareness of discrepancies between what consumers do and say, the effects of state data breach notification laws, and the connections between data breaches and identity theft generally 143 is being generated by a recent Carnegie Mellon University study that analyzes data from the FTC in an attempt to measure the -impact of data breach disclosure laws on identity theft over the years 2002 to 2006.‖ 144 Using -state and year fixed effect regression analysis to empirically estimate the impact of data breach laws,‖ the study finds "no statistically significant" evidence that data breach notification laws reduce identity theft, -even after considering income, urbanization, strictness of law and interstate commerce.‖ 145 While the authors of the Carnegie Mellon study admit that there may be some issues with the underlying methodology used in the study, 146 and payments industry data security analysts have noted that it is difficult to draw conclusions from the study because the underlying data (reports submitted by consumers to the FTC) are often incomplete, 147 they note that the FTC remains the only source for this kind of data.
Summing up the state data breach notification law portion of the workshop, attendees acknowledged that while the potential for consistent data breach regulations or standards has been well recognized by payments industry participants, 148 recent research suggests that more work is needed to better determine what kinds of initiatives might be most effective in preventing fraud and protecting consumers. However, they recognized that any organization that possesses or handles consumers' personal information needs to be prepared for an attack on its data security systems. Workshop participants noted that irrespective of nuances in states' data breach notification laws, it simply makes sense to be prepared for a breach in today's technological environment-one where wireless devices abound, remote access is commonplace, and the services of third-party consultants and vendors are necessary.
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VI. Conclusion
For more than a decade federal and state legislators have sought to create a more structured and secure environment for private consumer data and to help protect consumers whose personal information has been compromised; however, challenges and issues remain. These include forming a better understanding of the links that connect data breaches, identity theft, and fraud; establishing more universally understood data breach notification requirements for businesses (or even a commonly recognized definition for data breaches); overcoming obstacles related to consumers (such as ensuring that consumers understand breach, opt-out, or policy notices they receive and avoiding consumer 147 desensitization to these types of information); 150 and creating solutions that are flexible enough to adjust to changes in technology and fraudsters' tactics. Pointing to today's technological environment, one in which wireless devices and remote access are commonplace, workshop participants noted that attacks on data security systems can and will be staged in new and unanticipated ways-something that must be anticipated by policymakers and industry participants alike. Participants also drew attention to the fact that the problem extends well beyond criminal attacks on computer systems, noting that leaked data also originates from the actions of organizations' own employees, whether negligent or intentional.
Furthermore, participants also suggested that increasing reliance on third-party data processors, data storage suppliers, and other third-party data service providers will create additional challenges to safeguarding consumers' financial information as massive files containing such information change hands more frequently and come into contact with more individuals. The workshop concluded with participants encouraging the Payment Cards Center to continue promoting critical dialogue and research on these issues as an important contribution to the industry's (and policymakers') efforts to develop effective solutions.
